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BRZONKALA, LOPEZ, AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
CANARD: A SYNTHESIS OF COMMERCE CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
BRADLEY A. HARSCH*
INTRODUCTION
Though the constitutional structure of enumerated powers was intended to limit
the scope of federal power to certain specifically-described domains, Congress has
passed a number of laws under the Commerce Clause that are, at best, only
tenuously related to its power to regulate interstate commerce. The Supreme Court
has often approved such laws on the grounds that the problem they regulate
"substantially affects" interstate commerce; however, in doing so, the Supreme
Court has given the impression that Congress' power under the Commerce Clause
is logically limitless. The Court tried to dispel this impression in its most recent
major Commerce Clause case, United States v. Lopez.' However, the limits imposed
by Lopez are demonstrably untenable and under-inclusive. The Court will again take
up the issue of Congress' commerce power this term in Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University,2 in which the Court will presumably
decide the constitutionality of a civil rights remedy in the Violence Against Women
Act of 1994.3
The "substantial effects" test and Lopez share an infirmity that is present in all
of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence to date-the Court's
formal tests have failed to incorporate factors that truly govern the outcome of the
decision. A close examination of case law reveals that Commerce Clause cases are
decided according to certain formally unarticulated factors that have been
consistently present throughout all of the superficial changes in Commerce Clause
doctrine. These factors reflect a struggle between two imperatives: the need to
permit the federal government enough power to handle important commerce-related
social issues, and the need to limit that same power.
Unfortunately, Commerce Clause cases to date have failed to strike a balance
between these two imperatives. Cases seeking to limit the commerce power have
formulated under-inclusive distinctions that, if faithfully applied, would prevent the
federal government from solving important commerce-related problems only it can
solve. Meanwhile, cases expanding the commerce power have formulated over-
inclusive rules for which no limit on federal power is thinkable. The "substantial
effects" test is an example of an over-inclusive rule whose breadth is illusory unless
the factors that really drive the decisions are taken into account. By the same token,
Lopez formulates an under-inclusive rule whose narrowness is also illusory.
A corollary to the Court's over- and under-inclusive rule-making is that the Court
has never adequately described the parameters of Congress' commerce power. The
* B.A. The Ohio State University, 1993; J.D. University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall), 1998;
Associate, Latham & Watkins, San Francisco; Clerk, Hon. David D. Dowd, Jr., United States District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio. The author wishes to thank Professor John Yoo for his guidance in writing this piece.
1. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
2. 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom U.S. v. Morrison, - S. Ct.., No. 99-5, 1999
WL 459152 (Sept. 1999).
3. 42 U.S.C. § § 13931-14040 (1994) [hereinafter VAWA].
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root cause of this problem is the Court's failure to formally adopt rules of decision
which reflect factors that really determine the outcome of the Commerce Clause
cases. This article identifies four factors that explain the outcome of the Commerce
Clause cases more consistently than the rules the Court ostensibly applies. These
factors constitute a four-prong test by which, this article contends, Commerce
Clause cases have always been decided. An evaluation of case law reveals that this
four-prong test describes Congress' commerce power more accurately than the
doctrines thus far formulated by the Court. Brzonkala promises to be no different.
To remedy the confusion and inconsistency which have resulted from poor
formulation of Commerce Clause rules, this article proposes that the Court formally
adopt the four-prong test that has governed its Commerce Clause jurisprudence
from the start. Under the test, where a statute does not fall squarely within
Congress' power to regulate the channels and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, then 1) the regulation must have a nexus to the Commerce Clause; 2) the
regulation must address a serious exigency; 3) the exigency must necessitate a
national solution; and 4) the regulation must not upset the proper balance between
federal and state governments.
Although formally employing this test would present problems regarding how to
administer it, such a test is ultimately workable and its benefits would make the
difficulties worthwhile. The test would put Commerce Clause jurisprudence on a
reasonable and tenable footing by bringing to light the considerations which
actually drive Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Part I illustrates the inadequacy of the Commerce Clause rules the Court has
formulated to date. Part 11 shows that Commerce Clause jurisprudence is best
explained by reference not to these flawed rules but to the four-prong test identified
above. Part III shows how this four-prong test should be formally adopted, and Part
IV evaluates the propriety of replacing the current rules of decision with the
proposed test. Part V concludes the paper with an application of the proposed test
to the VAWA, in anticipation of how Brzonkala is likely to be decided.
I. THE PROBLEM WITH COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
Since Congress' power "[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States
.. 4 was granted in 1787, the Commerce Clause has been used to effectuate a
sundry array of federal laws: prohibition of lottery tickets moving across state
lines,5 setting of minimum hour and wage laws,6 environmental regulation,7
prohibition of race discrimination in public accommodations and restaurants,8
regulation of wheat grown for personal use,9 prohibition of loansharking,' ° the
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
5. See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
6. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
7. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
8. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964).
9. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
10. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
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creation of a civil rights remedy for violent acts against women," and many others.
Though the sphere of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause may seem
boundless, the Supreme Court has occasionally declared certain Congressional
enactments to exceed that power.
An investigation of Commerce Clause cases shows that two competing
imperatives underlie the law in this field: the need to permit the federal government
enough power to handle important commerce-related issues and the need to limit
that power. In favoring one or the other imperative, the Court has consistently erred
on the side of over- or under-inclusiveness, never arriving at a test which properly
describes the dimensions of the commerce power. This problem has been extant
since the Commerce Clause first became a subject of federal court cases but has
found its most recent expression in Lopez, in which, for the first time in sixty years,
the Court invalidated a federal law as being beyond Congress' commerce power.
The Court will again address the issue of Congress' commerce power when it
decides Brzonkala."2
A. Cases Limiting Congress' Commerce Power Have Devised Under-inclusive
Rules
As Justice Souter makes clear in his Lopez dissent, cases purporting to limit the
commerce power have engaged in "untenable jurisprudence." 3 Lopez itself is no
exception, but deserves a special discussion which is deferred to the end of this
section. For the moment, it is sufficient to illustrate that the Supreme Court has
never articulated a viable test curbing Congress' commerce power:1 4 its rules have
all proven under-inclusive.
The Court decided the first major case limiting Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause in 1895. In United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,' 5 Congress had
attempted to avert the creation of a monopoly among certain sugar refineries. In
holding that such regulation was beyond Congress' power, the Court found that a
distinction between manufacture and commerce was "vital" to maintaining state
autonomy, which depended on the states' ability to exercise police power
regulations to the exclusion of federal government. 6 The Court again employed the
distinction between manufacture and commerce in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,7
11. See VAWA, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
12. 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom U.S. v. Morrison. S. Ct.., No. 99-5, 1999
WL 459152 (Sept. 1999).
13. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 608 (1995).
14. An exception is Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), in which the Court employed the Tenth
Amendment to prevent application of the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act to state judges and other
state appointees on a policymakdng level. Aside from Lopez, Gregory v. Ashcroft represents the only doctrinal limit
on the commerce power that has not been overturned or abandoned; however, its applicability is extremely narrow
in light of Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), which permits federal regulation only
of non-policymaking state employees.
15. 156U.S. 1(1895).
16. See id. at 11-13.
17. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
Spring 1999]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
invalidating the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935," which was meant to
stabilize the bituminous coal industry.19
Less than a year after Carter, the Court abandoned the manufacture/commerce
distinction. In National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,2°
the Court sidestepped Carter despite a fact pattern which invited its application and
upheld labor legislation which protected collective bargaining by preventing
companies from discharging employees who were active in unions.2 Carter and
E. C. Knight have been obsolete ever since.
Other cases attempting to limit federal power have suffered the same fate. In
Hammer v. Dagenhart,22 the Court invalidated the Child Labor Law. The
government had claimed it could regulate child labor because the goods made by
children flowed in interstate commerce.23 Although precedent permitted Congress
to prohibit "noxious articles" that cross state lines,' the Court distinguished such
articles because the goods made from child labor were themselves harmless.25
Hammer, however, was expressly overruled in United States v. Darby,26 in which
the Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act of 193827 on the grounds that the
labor conditions the Act sought to ameliorate had a "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce.
28
In Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,29 the Court originated yet another
limiting rule that later cases left by the wayside. In Schechter, the Court disallowed
prosecution under the Code of Competition for the Live Poultry Industry, which set
wage and hours restrictions in the chicken industry.30 The Court ruled that the
Commerce Clause could not reach the defendant's business because the business
was conducted almost exclusively within New York.3' Schechter also employed a
"direct/indirect effects" test, concluding that whatever effect defendant's business
practices may have had on interstate commerce, those effects were too indirect to
fall under the commerce power.32
Neither of the Schechter rationales would find currency in today's Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. Under United States v. Pere33 and Wickard v. Filburn,34
Congress can touch behavior that is within a class of activities having a substantial
18. Act of Aug. 30, 1935 ch. 824 § § 1-23, 49 Stat. 991. repeaed by Act of Apr. 26, 1936, ch. 127 § 20(a),
50 Stat. 90.
19. See Carter, 298 U.S. at 278.
20. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
21. See id. at 49. (the Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § § 151-169
(1994)).
22. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
23. See id. at 271.
24. See id at 271-72; Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (prohibition of interstate transportation of lottery
tickets); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (prohibiting interstate transportation of bad eggs).
25. See Hammer, 247 U.S. at 272.
26. 312U.S. 100, 117(1941).
27. 29 U.S.C. § § 201-219 (1994).
28. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 120-21.
29. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
30. See id. at 524.
31. See id. at 542-43.
32. See id. at 546.
33. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
34. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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effect on commerce, even if the specific activity in question neither has an effect on
commerce nor has any particular connection to movement across state lines.35
Hence, wage and hours restrictions on a purely local business would be upheld
because the activity is in a class of activities affecting commerce.
Another now-abandoned curb on the commerce power was put forth in National
League of Cities v. Usery,36 a Tenth Amendment case. The Court invalidated the
1974 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,37 which extended the
Act to almost all employees of state and local government, because the Amend-
ments impinged on an area of governance in which the states had traditionally
exercised complete sovereignty. 38 National League of Cities was overturned in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.39
B. Cases Affirming Federal Power Have Articulated Over-inclusive Rules
While cases seeking to limit the federal commerce power have not devised
lasting tests, cases affirming federal power under the Commerce Clause have
suffered another infirmity-they have no logical stopping point. The "substantial
effects" test, by which Congress can regulate activities having a substantial effect
on interstate commerce, has been in use ever since National Labor Relations Board
and Darby.'" But many commentators have pointed out that it provides no limitation
on the powers Congress can exercise through the Commerce Clause.41 Since this
point has been made exhaustively, there is no need to repeat it in detail. Suffice it
to say that, except for Lopez, this test has grown ever more inclusive in the modern
era.42 The thinking that springs from the modern pre-Lopez cases could permit
Congress to "regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic
productivity of individual citizens" and could even reach areas such as marriage,
divorce and child custody, for example.43 As the Lopez majority points out, "it is
difficult to perceive any limitation [under the substantial effects test], even in areas
35. See infra notes 135-44 and accompanying text.
36. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
37. 29 U.S.C. § § 201-219(1994).
38. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.
39. 469 U.S. 528. The majority overruled National League of Cities because it found the test unworkable.
See idL at 546-47. The dissenters in Garcia claimed the majority had severely misread the National League of Cities
test. See infra note 161.
40. Precise illustrations of the evolution of the substantial effects test are available in other sources. See,
e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (explained throughout the majority opinion); Judge Louis H. Pollack,
Symposium: Reflections on United States v. Lopez: Forward, 94 MIcH. L REV. 533 (1995); Rachel Elizabeth
Smith, Note, United States v. Lopez: Reaffirming the Federal Commerce Power and Remembering Federalism,
45 CATH. U. L REv. 1459 (1996). Consequently, I will not repeat the task here.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,564-65 (1995) (majority opinion); id. at 593 (Thomas,
J., concurring); Donald H. Regan, Symposium: Reflections on United States v. Lopez: How to Think About the
Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L REV. 554, 559-562
(1995); Smith, supra note 38, at 1503-06; Barry C. Toone & Bradley J. Wiskirchen, Great Expectations: The
Illusion of Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 22 J. LEGIS. 241, 257-59 (1996).
42. See Regan, supra note 39, at 561. Precise illustrations of the evolution of the substantial effects test are
available in other sources. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
43. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
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such as criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been
sovereign.""
C. Lopez Also Fails as an Effective Check on Federal Commerce Power
Lopez was supposed to have stemmed the tide of the expanding "substantial
effects" test. After sixty years of deference to expansions of federal power under the
Commerce Clause, Lopez invalidated a federal statute on the grounds that Congress
had exceeded its bounds. This decision triggered much scholarly debate over
whether Lopez would prove historically significant as a limitation on the commerce
power.45 However, in the words of Donald H. Regan, Lopez has "not so much
changed the situation as confused it."'
In Lopez, the Court considered the validity of the Gun-Free School Zones Act,47
which made it a federal crime for a person to "knowingly... possess a firearm at
a place that [he or she] knows... is a school zone."48 The Lopez Court invalidated
the Act, but its stated reasons no better provide a logical limit to the commerce
power than previous Commerce Clause cases. The first grounds on which Lopez
invalidated the Act is that Congress had made no findings that guns-in-schools
substantially affects interstate commerce.49 This grounds was criticized by the
dissenting Justices, who made a fair case that Congress at least had a "rational
basis" for finding that, by degrading quality of education, the presence of guns in
school zones reduces the future productivity of America's youth and hence
substantially affects interstate commerce."
Although the Lopez opinion is often regarded as requiring a stricter inquiry than
the "rational basis" test, the issue of findings ignores the real problem, which is that
almost everything in the modem world can be found to substantially affect
commerce-divorces, availability of parking or public transportation in cities, slow
or inefficient state bureaucracies, local zoning ordinances, poor education,
ineffectual snow-removal from roads, burglary and car-theft. It seems that whether
or not Congress goes to the trouble of actually documenting the substantial effects
of these activities on commerce should not make a difference whether they are
regulable.5 '
The second grounds on which Lopez purported to limit the commerce power is
in making a distinction between regulation of commercial activity and noncommer-
44. Id.
45. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Wising Up: Supreme Court Restores the Constitutional Structure, CHIi. TRMi.,
May 2, 1995, at 17; Richard Lacayo, The Soul of a New Majority: In Most of the Supreme Court's Significant
Rulings This Year, The Combination was Five Right Four Left, TIME, Jul. 10, 1995, at 46. But see Pollack, supra
note 38, at 553; Toone & Wiskirchen. supra note 39. at 241 (both articles argue that Lopez is not such an important
decision after all).
46. See Regan, supra note 39, at 559. Lopez also inspired at least two symposia on the topic. See
Symposium, The New Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L REv. 633 (1995); Symposium,
Reflections on United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L REV. 533 (1995).
47. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
48. lL (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(l)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V)).
49. See id. at 563.
50. Seeid. at618-625.
51. See Regan, supra note 39, at 562-63.
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cial activity.52 In striking down the civil rights remedy provision of the VAWA, the
Fourth Circuit in Brzonkala relied heavily on this commerciallnon-commercial
activity distinction.53 Donald H. Regan terms this distinction a "highly tendentious"
gloss on previous Commerce Clause cases' because, though not inconsistent with
them, there is nothing in those cases to suggest that the focus be on the commercial
nature of the regulated activity rather than on the activity's effect on commerce.5
More importantly, however, Regan points out that "it is easy to think up cases in
which Congress's power to regulate noncommercial local behavior under the
Commerce Clause should be obvious." '56 As examples, Regan cites private sport-
hunting of migratory birds, drunk driving on interstate highways, or backyard
incinerators that emit airborne toxins found to accumulate hundreds of miles
away. 7 In short, concludes Regan, Lopez "is not only offering a gloss on existing
doctrine" but it is an "unacceptable gloss.
58
Lower courts, and perhaps the Supreme Court itself, have recognized the
untenability of Lopez's commercial/non-commercial distinction. For instance, in a
challenge to the Endangered Species Act,59 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit rejected the distinction outright. That decision, written by Judge
Patricia Wald, claimed support from a 1997 Supreme Court case which permitted
Congress to regulate charitable organizations even though they are not organized
for profit.' The Ninth Circuit has also upheld a post-Lopez challenge to the Eagle
Protection Act.6 '
Further, Lopez's purported limitations on Congress' commerce power can easily
be circumvented by adding a jurisdictional nexus to the Gun-Free School Zones
Act. By requiring that the Act only apply to guns moving in interstate commerce,
the Act could pass Constitutional muster because the issue of substantial effects
would then be moot. Perez would probably make it unnecessary that the particular
gun in question have actually moved in interstate commerce; it would be sufficient
that the gun was part of a general category of things (guns) that move in interstate
commerce. In any event, most guns move in interstate commerce so the effect of the
Act would be much the same despite a jurisdictional nexus.
In fact, Congress attempted just this maneuver. On September 30, 1996 it passed
a revised version of the Act that was different by only twelve words. Congress
merely modified the phrase, "It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to
possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to
52. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551, 561-62.
53. See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 830-36.
54. See Regan, supra note 39, at 564. Regan also points out an amusing irony: Lopez was being paid to act
as a courier for delivering the gun to someone else, and hence was engaged in commercially motivated behavior.
See id. n.46 (citing Brief for the United States at 7, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (No. 93-1260)).
55. See Regan, supra note 39, at 564.
56. Id.
57. See id
58. Id.
59. 16 U.S.C. § § 1531-1544 (1994).
60. See National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1050 (1997) (citing Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, 117 S. Ct. 1590, 1602 (1997)).
61. See United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475 (1996).
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believe, is a school zone," by requiring that the firearm be one "that has moved in
or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce."62
It is clear then that insofar as Lopez maintains the substantial effects test, it is
over-inclusive. Insofar as it draws a distinction between commercial and non-
commercial activity, it is under-inclusive.
D. The Problem with Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Restated
Although, with the exception of Lopez, modem cases have consistently permitted
expansion in federal power, these cases have never abandoned the notion, extant
since the earliest days of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, that Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause is somehow bounded.63 Even the four dissenting
justices in Lopez claim their position would not lead to a limitless federal power.64
The problem with Commerce Clause jurisprudence is thus apparent: "On the one
hand, we have a collection of doctrinal rules that, if we take them seriously, allow
Congress to do anything it wants under the commerce power. On the other hand, we
continue to pay lip service to the idea the Congress's power is limited. '65 As was
demonstrated earlier in this paper, the "substantial effects" test provides no true
check on the commerce power. It was also shown that even Lopez fails to provide
such a constraint. Nevertheless, the Courts have not abandoned the notion that the
federal government's commerce power is limited. If this notion is to be taken
seriously, as it should be, then there must be another way.
IH. THE TRUTH ABOUT COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The problem of over-and under-inclusiveness is a result of the Court's failure to
incorporate into its rules the factors that truly determine the outcome of the cases
it decides. This accounts for the fact that despite its failure to articulate a rule
capable of corralling federal power, the Court nevertheless insists that federal
power is somehow limited. The Court's failure to devise a plausible doctrine shows
that the rules the Court has formulated must be regarded ultimately as rationaliza-
tions of a priori decisions, rather than as lines of thinking by which the Court has
reached its conclusion. In other words, the Court creates these rules after its
decisions are made. Hence, Commerce Clause cases are not entirely decided
according to the rules articulated by the Court, but according to factors that remain
in the shadows.
The question then to ask is, what are the factors by which the Court formulates
its Commerce Clause rules? They are four: 1) the nexus to interstate commerce; 2)
62. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
63. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("We always have
rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal power that would permit Congress to exercise
a police power; our cases are quite clear that there are real limits to federal power.").
64. See id. at 624 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("To hold this statute constitutional is not to 'obliterate' the
'distinction between what is national and what is local.").
65. Regan, supra note 39, at 554. Regan points out that some scholars advocate abandoning the idea of
limits altogether. See id. at 559. However, since not even the dissenters in Lopez have gone this far, I do not find
it necessary to refute these arguments. See generally WILLIAM WINsLow CROSSKEY, PoLrrlcs AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1953) (arguing that even as a matter of Constitutional
history, the federal government was never intended to be limited in any significant degree).
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the seriousness of the exigency with which Congress is faced; 3) the necessity that
the regulation or law in question be national rather than state or local; and 4) the
balance between the federal and state governments (concerns about federalism).
Deciding the exact parameters of these factors for purposes of formally applying the
four-prong test will be discussed in section three. For now, the aim is to demon-
strate that theses factors are more descriptive of Commerce Clause jurisprudence
than the Court's own rules of decision.
The Court has in fact employed a version of the four-prong test throughout the
history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but has presented only the first "nexus"
prong as its rule of decision. Indeed, the Court has essentially attempted to collapse
all four factors into one "nexus" test. To see this, the reader must mentally impose
the four-prong test onto the case law. The nexus prong corresponds with the test as
the Court has formally articulated it. For instance, regulation of the channels and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce can be thought of as having a strong nexus
to the Commerce Clause, since the Court has allowed regulation of such activity
almost without exception. The substantial effects test should also be thought of as
providing a nexus to interstate commerce. However, in the substantial effects test,
the unarticulated factors in the four-prong test determine how strong a nexus the
Court will require. This is why the Court's test is better thought of as a "nexus" test
than a categorical device.
In requiring a nexus to the Commerce Clause, the Court has occasionally
considered whether or not a regulation comports with the purpose for which the
Commerce Clause was created-maintenance of free trade among the states. If a
regulation is far from this purpose, it has been accompanied by the strong presence
of the latter three factors in the four-prong test. Conversely, if the purpose of the
Commerce Clause has been directly served by the regulation, the Court will validate
the regulation even if the other three factors have made a weaker showing.
As to those other three factors, the requirement that there be a serious exigency
facing Congress means that Congress must be addressing some real problem
requiring government action. In Lopez, for instance, we see evidence that the
problem Congress faced was not thought to be a serious one and that in fact the
Court believed Congress was grandstanding rather than facing a crisis. The absence
of this factor in Lopez helps explain why the Court was willing to invalidate the
Gun-Free School Zones Act.
The third requirement-that the exigency faced needs a national solu-
tion-means that the states must be separately unable to handle the problem
Congress seeks to solve. Whether because of collective action problems or mere
state incompetency, a national solution has been necessary in all the cases in which
the Court has expanded the commerce power (i.e., permitted a weaker nexus to the
Commerce Clause). In cases where the exercise of commerce power has been
denied, the need for a national solution has been less clear.
Finally, the federal/state balance factor revolves around federalism. The Court
has been more restrictive in allowing an exercise of the commerce power when it
has believed that the exercise threatens the system of federalism. Conversely, the
Court has been more willing to permit the exercise of the commerce power where
such exercise has not been perceived as threatening the federal/state balance.
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Mentally imposing the four-prong test on the case law, the reader will find that
the Court's formal test-which only encompasses the "nexus" prong of the four-
prong test by which the Court actually decides Commerce Clause cases-has
evolved in response to the other three factors of the four-prong test. Indeed, changes
in the Court's formal test are best explained not as logical extensions of then-
current doctrine, but in terms of the four-prong test.
Hence, where the Court has demonstrated less concern with the problem
Congress seeks to solve and where the Court has shown concern for the federal/state
balance, the Court has required a stronger nexus to interstate commerce. Con-
versely, where the Court has taken seriously the problem Congress is addressing,
where the problem requires a national solution, and where the Court has shown little
concern about upsetting the federal/state balance, it has allowed a looser connection
to interstate commerce, oftentimes devising unprecedented categorizations that
seem to expand Congress' commerce power in an overly broad manner.
We will see that the modern "substantial effect" nexus to interstate commerce
has proven especially responsive to the other three factors, which have not been
incorporated into the Court's formal analysis. Thus, the Court has accepted a more
tenuous nexus to interstate commerce when Congress seeks to address a serious
exigency requiring national action whose regulation will not upset the federal/state
balance. Conversely, we will see that in Lopez, the Court's decision is best
explained by the absence of a demonstrated serious problem needing a national
solution, and by the presence of concerns about the federal/state balance. Hence, the
seeming overbreadth of the substantial effects test is attributable to the fact that it
has been applied only where there is a serious exigency requiring national action
that the Court believes will not upset the federal/state balance.
Surprisingly, language in the cases themselves provides substantial support for
the proposition that the four-prong test actually governs the commerce power. The
Court consistently mentions the seriousness of the exigency facing the government,
the need for a national solution, and a concern for federalism, even though
according to its formal test these factors should not matter to its decision. The
recurrence of such language throughout the case law indicates the existence of a
doctrine underpinning and indeed shaping the formal rules of decision.
Thinking of the commerce power cases in light of the four-prong test leads to the
same results as the formal doctrine. Further, these factors synthesize the cases in
such a way that eliminates seeming contradictions among them. Hence, Commerce
Clause doctrine is clearer and easier to understand by reference to the four-prong
test than to the doctrine as formally articulated.
A. How the New Test Explains the Court's Holdings in the Early Cases
Gibbons v. Ogden,' the Court's first major pronouncement on the Commerce
Clause, involved an act of the New York legislature granting Robert R. Livingston
and Robert Fulton monopoly rights for using steamboats on all navigable waters
within the state. Thomas Gibbons, with a federal license to carry on coastal trade,
66. 22 U.S. 1(1824).
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sought to use New York's waters in violation of Livingston and Fulton's
monopoly.67 The issue was whether New York law or the federal license prevailed.
In Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall strongly affirms the power of the federal
government to regulate the nation's navigable waters: "[T]he power to regulate
... is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges
no limitations, other than those prescribed in the constitution."" This passage has
since been cited to justify significant expansions in the commerce power;69
however, by reading Gibbons in terms of the four-prong test, one finds that
Marshall's language should be thought of more narrowly.
The activity being regulated in Gibbons was commercial in nature and took place
on a channel of commerce, so the nexus to Congress' power was very strong.
Further, as Regan points out, the necessity of national action was indisputable.7 °
Protectionist legislation such as enacted by the New York legislature threatened
interstate commerce and could not be dealt with by any power other than a national
government. A serious exigency also faced Congress: such protectionist legislation
could significantly impede free trade among the states.
Perhaps the most important factor in this decision was Marshall's concern for the
federal/state balance. At the time Gibbons was decided, the role of the federal
government in the Constitutional scheme was unsettled and states retained a great
deal of power.7' Marshall was concerned with the long term viability of the federal
government to meet the demands that faced the nation.72 Marshall's concern about
striking an improper federal/state balance seems to have been at the heart of his
decision.
Language from Gibbons gives credence to the proposition that the Court actually
employed a four-prong test. Marshall states that "[t]he genius and character of the
whole government seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all the external
concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States
generally. '73 This statement implies that Congress' commerce power was only
meant to be used where the States found mutual benefit and thus suggests a test that
hinges on the necessity of federal action.
Other parts of Marshall's opinion also suggest a "necessity of federal action"
prong. Marshall writes that the commerce power should not extend to concerns
"which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States,
and with which it is not necessary to interfere .... I Another passage from
Gibbons also bears this out:
It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce, which is
completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or
between different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect
67. See id. at 2.
68. Id. at 196.
69. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 594 (Thomas, J., concuring); Parez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151 (1971);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942).
70. See Regan, supra note 39. at 573.
71. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 48-49 (1993).
72. See id. at 38-39, 47-49.
73. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 195.
74. Id. at 195 (emphasis added).
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other States. Such a power would be inconvenient, and is certainly
unnecessary."
The next major Commerce Clause case came in 1895. In United States v. E.C.
Knight Co.,7 6 the defendant owned a number of sugar refineries and had been
charged with violating a law prohibiting conspiracies "in restraint of trade and
commerce among the several states."77 The Court ruled that because Congress was
seeking to regulate manufacture, rather than commerce, its Act was not permissible
under the Commerce Clause. 8
Although it seems clear that the national government was faced with a problem
only it could handle-preventing monopolies among nationwide businesses-the
other prongs of the test were not satisfied here. The Court mentions nothing of the
seriousness of the exigency at hand; indeed, E.C. Knight took place just as
monopolistic business practices were only beginning to be recognized as problem-
atic.79 Further, the nexus to the commerce power was more questionable than in
Gibbons. To the Court, the fact that this involved manufacture and not trade gave
Congress' enactment a dubious connection to the commerce power.
As in Gibbons, E. C. Knight is best explained as a function of the Court's concern
for the system of federalism. The Court stated:
It is vital that the independence of the commercial power and of the police
power, and the delimitation between them, however sometimes perplexing,
should always be recognized and observed, for while the one furnishes the
strongest bond of union, the other is essential to the preservation of the
autonomy of the States as required by our dual form of government.'
Justice Harlan's dissent in E.C. Knight also expresses concern for the vitality of
federalism. Even though he voted for allowing the exercise of federal commerce
power, he acknowledged that "[u]ndoubtedly, the preservation of the just authority
of the States is an object of deep concern to every lover of his country. No greater
calamity could befall our free institutions than the destruction of that authority, by
whatever means such a result might be accomplished.""1
For Harlan, however, federalism concerns weighed in less heavily than the need
for the national government to address issues within its unique competence. He
wrote:
the preservation of the just authority of the General Government is essential as
well to the safety of the States as to the attainment of the important ends for
which that government was ordained by the People of the United States; and the
75. Id. at 194 (emphasis added).
76. 156 U.S. 1(1895).
77. Id. at 2.
78. See id. at 12.
79. Cf. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (national legislation aimed at curbing
monopolistic abuses).
80. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 13.
81. Id. at 19.
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destruction of that authority would be fatal to the peace and well-being of the
American people. 2
Both the majority and dissent in E.C. Knight suggest the use of the four-prong test.
Champion v. Ames, 3 decided in 1903, represents a significant permutation of
Congress' commerce power that is also best explained in terms of the four-prong
test. Congress had passed an "act for the suppression of lottery traffic through
national and interstate commerce.... ,84 Rejecting arguments that Congress' Act
was a prohibition of commerce and not a regulation of it, 5 Champion was the first
major Commerce Clause case to permit an enactment that did not protect or
facilitate interstate commerce. 6 As such, it is not a necessary extension of then-
current doctrine, especially given the purpose for which the Clause was originally
created.
Since the regulation in Champion is essentially one of police power, it can be
thought of as having a questionable nexus to the commerce power. But the Court
nevertheless permitted Congress' regulation because (in the eyes of the Court)
Congress was facing a very serious exigency that only Congress was capable of
meeting. The Court stated that the "pestilence of lotteries... infests the whole
community; it enters every dwelling; it reaches every class; it preys hard upon the
earnings of the poor; it plunders the ignorant and the simple."8" Deeming lottery
tickets an "evil of ... appalling character," the Court stated that "[w]e should
hesitate long before adjudging" that such an evil "cannot be met and crushed by the
only power competent to that end."8 The Court then upheld Congress' Act because
"Congress alone has the power to occupy... the whole field of interstate com-
merce."89 Even though consideration of the unique competence of a national power
to solve the problem of lotteries does not find its way into Champion's formal
doctrine, it is apparent the Court gave it countenance.
Also, the Court was not concerned with upsetting the balance between the federal
and state governments because most if not all of the states had already legislated
against lottery tickets.' Hence, the Court was careful to state that Congress had not
"assumed to interfere with the completely internal affairs of any State" but merely
"supplemented the action of those states.""a
Shreveport Rate Cases,9' decided in 1914, is another change in doctrine that is
most sensible when viewed in terms of the four-prong test. In Shreveport Rate
Cases, an action by the Interstate Commerce Commission was challenged because
it sought to regulate railroad rates set entirely within one state. Texas railways had
been setting "higher rates from Shreveport [, Louisiana] to points in Texas than
82. Id. at 19.
83. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
84. Id.
85. See id. at 354.
86. See id. at 353.
87. Id. at 356.
88. Id. at 357-58.
89. Id. at 358.
90. See id. at 357; Regan, supra note 39, at 576.
91. Champion, 188 U.S. at 357.
92. Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. V. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
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were in force from cities in Texas to such points under substantially similar
conditions and circumstances."" The ICC's order imposed a duty on the rail
companies not to discriminate against interstate transportation.
The Court upheld the ICC's order, declaring that Congress' authority extended
to matters having a "close and substantial relation" to interstate commerce.94 But
this is the first instance in which this test had been used. Indeed, the Shreveport
Rate decision is hard to justify in terms of precedent because of the previous
emphasis on the interstate/intrastate distinction.
However, in terms of the four-prong test, this case is easily comprehensible. The
nexus to commerce is fairly strong since this is the kind of protectionism which the
Commerce Clause was meant to overcome. The suppressive effect of discriminatory
rate setting on interstate commerce could not be denied. A last hook into the
Commerce Clause is the fact that these companies were interstate carriers.
Further, that states alone could not deal with discriminatory rate setting is
evident-states were essentially posed with a "race-to-the-bottom" problem of
collective action. Hence, only a national power could deal with this problem. The
Court was aware of this: "unjust discrimination against interstate trade arises from
the relation of intrastate to interstate rates as maintained by a carrier subject to the
act. Such a matter is one with which Congress alone is competent to deal .... "9'
The necessity of a national solution is also referenced regarding the reason the
commerce power was created: "to provide the necessary basis of national unity by
insuring 'uniformity of regulation against conflicting and discriminating state
legislation."'96
The Court also regarded discriminatory rate setting as posing a serious problem.
It referred to Congress' ability to correct an "evil"' which was engendered by the
"rivalries of local government" and threatened to "destroy[] or impede[] interstate
trade."9" That Congress must have the power to meet these serious exigencies was
clear to the Court, which stated, "the authority of Congress is at all times adequate
to meet the varying exigencies that arise ... ."' Finally, concerns for federalism are
not strong in Shreveport Rate Cases since the states, by incorporating the
Commerce Clause into the Constitution, had agreed to relinquish control.over
protectionist economic policies."
A gloss of purposiveness is also justified by language in Shreveport Rate Cases.
The Court stated, "Interstate trade was not left to be destroyed or impeded by the
rivalries of local governments. The purpose was to make impossible the recurrence
of the evils which had overwhelmed the Confederation ... ."'0' The Court had a
93. Id. at 347.
94. lit at 351.
95. Id. at 358.
96. Id. at 350 (quoting County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691,697 (1880)) (emphasis added).
97. See i.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary
Comment, 25 MiNN. L REv. 432,481-94 (1941); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:
Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L REv. 1091, 1114 (1986).
101. Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. at 350.
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sense that Congress' regulation was consistent with the purpose for which the
Commerce Clause had been adopted.
Four years after Shreveport Rate Cases, the Court decided Hammer v.
Dagenhart.'° This case is another example of a formal rationale that is inadequate
to the results. Recall that in Hammer, the Court considered whether Congress could
enact child labor laws and concluded that because the goods made by children were
in themselves harmless, the manufacture of those goods was not subject to the
commerce power even though the goods traveled in interstate commerce. This
unprecedented test later gave way in Darby.
Hammer's under-inclusive rule becomes understandable with reference to the
four-prong test. The Court did not characterize child labor as presenting a serious
problem. Although the states were separately incompetent to act-the legislation
was aimed at eliminating the problem of states gaining competitive advantage over
others by permitting what were deemed unacceptable labor conditions--the Court's
interest in federalism took paramount importance in this case. The Court was
concerned that "all manufacture intended for interstate shipment would be brought
under federal control to the practical exclusion of the authority of the states.""1 3 The
Court then stated that the grant of power to Congress was not meant to:
give it authority to control the States in their exercise of the police power over
local trade and manufacture.
The grant of authority over a purely federal matter was not intended to
destroy the local power always existing and carefully reserved to the states in
the Tenth Amendment and the Constitution."0
Hence, the Child Labor Act"05 failed to pass the fourth prong of the test, that of
federal/state balance.
For Justice Holmes, who dissented in Hammer, the other factors were more
important than his concerns about federalism. Holmes was concerned with the
seriousness of the problem Congress faced and stated "if there is any matter upon
which civilized countries have agreed... it is the evil of premature and excessive
child labor."' ' His reference to "self-seeking" states"°7 also implies that national
action was necessary to fix the problem. Holmes' dissent uses the same analytical
factors as the majority opinion, but arrives at a different result.
In Schechter Poultry,' Congress was faced with a "grave national crisis""
implicating a serious exigency, but the enactment in question failed to satisfy the
other factors of the test. Congress had enacted a wage and hour regulation which the
government sought to apply to a company that conducted business almost entirely
within a single state. The Schechter Court found the legislation to be invalid and
stated that "[t]he distinction between direct and indirect effects of intrastate
102. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
103. Id. at 272.
104. Id. at 273-74.
105. Act of Sept. 1, 1916, ch. 432, 39 Stat. 675.
106. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 280 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
107. See id. at281.
108. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
109. Id. at 528.
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commerce must be recognized as a fundamental one, essential to the maintenance
of our constitutional system.""
Schechter's unprecedented and under-inclusive distinction, which is no longer
good law, makes sense when viewed in light of the four-prong test. The government
had argued that a federal solution was necessary because the "national crisis
demanded a broad and intensive cooperative effort by those engaged in trade and
industry, and this necessary cooperation was sought to be fostered by permitting
them to initiate the adoption of codes.' But the "necessity" argument was not
strong enough to overcome the Court's concern for the federal/state balance. "If the
Commerce Clause were construed to reach all enterprises and transactions which
could be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate commerce," wrote the Court,
"the federal authority would embrace practically all the activities of the people and
the authority of the state over its domestic concerns would exist only by sufferance
of the federal government.""' Thus, the Court concluded that a distinction between
direct and indirect effects was "essential to the maintenance of our constitutional
system."".3 Otherwise, stated the Court, "there would be virtually no limit to the
federal power."' ' Note, too, that the nexus to the commerce power in Schechter is
weaker than in other cases since the regulated activity took place wholly within one
state.
In the last of the premodern cases, Carter v. Carter Coal Co.," 5 the Court
decided that the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 193516 could not be upheld
under the Commerce Clause because the Act sought to regulate manufacture rather
than commerce. However, this distinction proved under-inclusive and need not have
been made had the Court formally articulated factors truly relevant to its decision.
The Carter Court was again faced with a serious problem only the national
government could solve. The government emphasized "the evils which come from
99117the struggle between employers and employees over the matter of wages ....
The coal industry operated nationwide and the Act, which sought to place an excise
tax on mining bituminous coal and to create labor standards for coal mines, could
not have been undertaken by the states alone. However, the Carter Court rejected
the argument that "the power of the federal government inherently extends to
purposes affecting the Nation as a whole with which the states severally cannot deal
or cannot adequately deal.""' Instead, the Court claims that this proposition has
been frequently offered and just as frequently discredited, indicating that all prongs
of the four-prong test must be satisfied.
110. Id. at 547 (the Schechter court struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act, Act of June 16, 1933,
ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 196).
111. Id. at529.
112. Id. at 546.
113. Id. at 548.
114. Id.
115. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
116. Act of Aug. 30, 1935 cl. 824 § § 1-23,49 Sta. 991, repealed by Act of Apr. 26, 1936, ch. 127 § 20(a),
50 Stat. 90.
117. Carter, 298 U.S. at 308.
118. Id. at 291.
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In Carter, as in Schechter, federalism concerns were the decisive factor in the
decision. "The determination of the Framers Convention and the ratifying
conventions to preserve complete and unimpaired state self-government in all
matters not committed to the general government is one of the plainest facts which
emerge from the history of their deliberations."" 9 The Court added:
[S]ince every addition to the national legislative power to some extent detracts
from or invades the power of the states, it is of vital moment that, in order to
preserve the fixed balance intended by the Constitution, the powers of the
general government be not so extended as to embrace any not within the express
terms of the several grants or the implications necessarily to be drawn
therefrom. 20
Once again, the federalism prong is the decisive factor in this pre-modern case.
B. Modem, Pre-Lopez Cases
The watershed cases of National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp. "' and United States v. Darby'2 provide the best circumstantial evidence
of the Court's willingness to alter existing Commerce Clause doctrine according to
the presence or absence of the factors in the four-prong test. In Jones & Laughlin
Steel, the Court considered the validity of the National Labor Relations Act of
1935,"' which guaranteed the right of laborers to organize and engage in collective
bargaining by prohibiting companies from discharging employees for union
activity. 24 The Court refused to distinguish between manufacture and commerce,
hence side-stepping the Carter test that would have limited the exercise of federal
power. The Jones & Laughlin Steel Court instead ruled, in a precursor to Darby,
that the "close and intimate relation" of steel manufacturing to commerce justified
federal rules on collective bargaining."
Jones & Laughlin Steel departed significantly from precedent, as the dissenting
justice and three concurring justices pointed out. 26 Like most of the other modem
cases, this departure is best explained with reference to the seriousness of the
exigency faced by Congress, the inability of the states to deal with it, and the
Court's lack of concern about a threat to federalism. The Court recognized that the
"[rlefusal to confer and negotiate has been one of the most prolific causes of strife.
This is such an outstanding fact in the history of labor disturbances that it is a
proper subject of judicial notice and requires no citation of instances." '27 Here, the
Court notes the serious nature of the problem before it. It is clear as well that
119. Id. at 295.
120. Id. at 294; see id. at 294-298.
121. 301 U.S. 1(1937).
122. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
123. 29 U.S.C. § § 151-169 (1994).
124. See Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 43.
125. See id. at 37.
126. See id. at 76 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 42.
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individual states could not deal with such problems since the industries were
organized "on a national scale."'
The Court also considered the federalism issue but did not find it decisive. The
Court, citing Schechter, stated:
Undoubtedly the scope of [the cormmerce] power must be considered in the light
of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace
effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them,
in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local, and create a completely centralized
government. The question is necessarily one of degree. 29
The Court took care not to employ a test that threatened the "maintenance of our
federal system."" 0 Hence, the regulation in question passed the fourth prong of the
test.
Four years later, in Darby, the Court originated the "substantial effects" test
which is in use today"' and which justified application of federal law to the
manufacture of products made by child labor. Not only did Darby deviate from
Carter's manufacture/commerce distinction; it also overruled Hammer v.
Dagenhart,'32 which held that Congress could only regulate items of interstate
commerce which in themselves were "harmful or deleterious"."' Indeed, this
significant and over-inclusive departure from precedent is hard to explain in
conventional terms since, as Justice Thomas points out in his concurring opinion to
Lopez, the substantial effects test has questionable support in the text or structure
of the Constitution." 4
Hence, the four-prong test best makes sense of Darby. As in Jones & Laughlin
Steel, the Court notes the seriousness of the exigency with which Congress dealt:
"the evils aimed at by the Act are the spread of substandard labor conditions
through the use of the facilities of interstate commerce for competition by the goods
so produced with those produced under the prescribed or better labor conditions."'' 35
The fact that states had economic incentives to maintain lower labor standards than
their neighbors means that states were separately incompetent to administer laws
which would improve the overall conditions of workers. The problem required a
national solution.
The Darby Court also quoted a passage from Munn v. Illinois'36 emphasizing its
finding that national action was necessary in this circumstance. The passage
indicates that at the heart of the establishment of national government is its
necessity: "when it was found necessary to establish a national government for
128. Id. at41.
129. Id. at 37.
130. Id. at 41.
131. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 110, 118(1941).
132. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
133. Darby, 312 U.S. at 116.
134. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-602 (1995).
135. Darby, 312 U.S. at 122.
136. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
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national purposes ... a part of the powers of the States and of the people of the
States was granted to the United States .... 137
Such thinking as is found in Darby is also apparent in the other modem
decisions, all of which except Lopez upheld federal exercise of the commerce power
and all of which articulate rules that, if viewed aside from the factors that gave rise
to them, seem over-inclusive. In Wickard v. Filburn,131 the defendant was a farmer
whose regulated activity, making flour for home consumption, 139 had nothing to do
with trading across state lines or even selling to others. The only connection to
interstate commerce was the fact that, in the aggregate, growing wheat for home
consumption had a substantial effect on the demand for wheat'--demand which
Congress sought to regulate. The Court therefore granted Congress the power to
prohibit home consumption of wheat.
In Wickard, the significant expansion of Congress' commerce power and its
weaker nexus is appropriately explained by the necessity of federal intervention and
the seriousness of the problem at hand. The Court noted that all of the four largest
wheat exporting countries had undertaken programs for the relief of growers, and
that "[s]uch plans have generally evolved toward control by the central
government""14 so that "[iun all of them wheat regulation is by the national
government."' 42 The Court also recognized that:
The wheat industry has been a problem industry for some years. Largely as a
result of increased foreign production and import restrictions, annual exports of
wheat and flour from the United States during the ten-year period ending in
1940 averaged less than 10 percent of total production, while during the 1920's
they averaged more than 25 per cent. The decline in the export trade has left a
large surplus in production, which in connection with an abnormally large
supply of wheat and other grains in recent years, caused congestion in a number
of markets; tied up railroad cars; and caused elevators in some instances to turn
away grains, and railroads to institute embargoes to prevent further
congestion. 43
Katzenbach v. McClung'" demonstrates a similar posture. This case allowed
Congress to use the Commerce Clause as a means of enacting public accommoda-
tions provisions in civil rights legislation. Ollie's Barbecue, the respondent,
procured 46 percent of its meat from a local supplier who, in turn, had procured it
from out-of-state sources.145 Therefore, the Court concluded that Congress had the
power to prohibit race discrimination at that restaurant. This was the first time the
Court had permitted Congress to reach practices at an establishment that received
goods from interstate commerce, rather than one that merely manufactured or
produced them.
137. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 294 (1936) (emphasis added).
138. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
139. Seeid. atll4.
140. See idi at 129.
141. Id. at 126.
142. Id. n.27.
143. Id. at 125.
144. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
145. See id. at 296.
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Viewed in isolation from other factors influencing this decision, McClung
represents a significant and seemingly boundless expansion of the commerce power.
However, McClung's over-inclusive rule should be interpreted as a reaction to the
serious problem of racial discrimination in the United States and to the well-known
recalcitrance of Southern states to correct that problem. Since the problem required
national action, the second and third prongs best make sense of McClung's weak
nexus to the Commerce Clause.
Heart of Atlanta Hotel, Inc. v. United States" also can be explained this way
since it involved similar facts and was decided on the same day as McClung. In that
case, the Court permitted Congress to enact civil rights legislation reaching hotels
and motels. However, the Court noted that 32 states had already enacted public
accommodation laws. 47 Hence, the Court considered the impact of this legislation
on the federal/state balance and did not find it prohibitive.
Perez v. United States,' decided in 1971, is also explicable by reference to the
four-prong test. Petitioner was a small-time loansharker prosecuted under the
Consumer Credit Protection Act.""9 The Court ruled that the Act could reach him
as an exercise of the commerce power because the petitioner's loansharking was in
a class of activities that had a substantial effect on commerce. However, Perez'
loansharking had no demonstrated connections to organized crime 50 and hence did
not in itself affect commerce. Nevertheless, application of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act to Perez was found valid.
In Perez, the strong presence of the second and third prongs of the test explain
the Court's willingness to expand its definition of the commerce power into
previously uncharted territory. Recognizing that Congress was faced with a serious
problem, the Court found that loansharking provided vital support for organized
crime which, in turn, had a leech-like effect on the nation's commerce.' 5' The Court
cites a finding by Congress that "[o]rganized crime ... is directly responsible for
murders, willful injuries to person and property, corruption of officials, and
terrorization of countless citizens ... ."152 The Court found that loansharking is
inextricably linked with organized crime and is "one way organized interstate crime
holds its guns to the heads of the poor and the rich alike and syphons funds from
numerous localities to finance its national operations."''
Moreover, the Court recognized that the problem needed a national solution. 4
The Court noted the comments of Senator Proxmire upon approval of the "loan
shark" provision of the Act: "If we are to win the battle against organized crime we
must.., give the Justice Department additional tools to deal with the problem. The
problem simply cannot be solved by the States alone. We must bring into play the
146. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
147. See id. at 259.
148. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
149. 18 U.S.C. § § 891-96 (1998).
150. See Perez, 402 U.S. at 157 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
151. See id. at 148-150.
152. Id. at 146 n.I.
153. Id. at 157.
154. See id. at 150.
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full resources of the Federal Government."'" Demonstrably, the Court considered
the necessity of federal action as a factor in its decision even though, according to
formal doctrine, it should not have.
Finally, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n 156 also makes
the necessity of a national solution the partial basis of its decision. The Court noted
that the Congressional committees "explained that inadequacies in existing state
laws and the need for uniform nationwide standards made federal regulations
imperative."'' 57 The Court wrote that the Act:
responds to a congressional finding that nationwide 'surface mining and
reclamation standards are essential in order to insure that competition in
interstate commerce among sellers of coal produced in different States will not
be used to undermine the ability of the several States to improve and maintain
adequate standards on coal mining within their borders.' The prevention of this
sort of destructive interstate competition is a traditional role for congressional
action under the Commerce Clause.58
The separate incompetence of the states to enact reclamation standards is evident
from this passage.
Further, Hodel displays concern with the seriousness of the problem at hand. The
Court quotes a Congressional finding that "surface coal mining activities have
imposed large social costs on the public... in many areas of the country in the form
of unreclaimed lands, water pollution, erosion, floods, slope failures, loss of fish
and wildlife resources, and a decline in natural beauty."'1 9 It is therefore evident that
the Court believed Congress' assessment of the situation as serious.
Tenth Amendment cases also betray the true nature of Commerce Clause
decisionmaking.W National League of Cities v. Usery'6' is the first modern case to
strike down a Congressional exercise of the Commerce Clause. Although it did so
on the basis of the Tenth Amendment, its rationale is instructive for purposes of this
paper's inquiry. The decision rested in part on distinguishing Fry v. United States62
as a case in which "[t]he enactment at issue... was occasioned by an extremely
serious problem which endangered the well-being of all the component parts of our
federal system and which only collective action by the National Government might
forestall.' 63 The play between Fry and Usery indicates that in deciding the extent
of Congress' commerce power, the necessity of federal action (as opposed to state
action) plays a significant role, as does the seriousness of the problem with which
Congress is faced.
155. Id.
156. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
157. Id. at 280 (citing S. REP. No. 95-128, at 49 (1977); H.R. REP. No.95-128, at 58 (1977)).
158. Id. at 281-82 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 1201(G) (1976 ed., Supp. E1)).
159. Id. at 279.
160. Although Tenth Amendment cases seem only to apply where the federal government seeks to use the
commerce power to touch a state apparatus, the doctrines and concerns overlap to other exercises of the commerce
power. That the Lopez decision quotes Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1971) is significant in this regard. See
supra note 12 and accompanying text.
161. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
162. 421 U.S. 542 (1975)
163. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 853.
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National League of Cities also supports a gloss of purposiveness in evaluating
Commerce Clause regulation. The Court considered "how closely the challenged
action implicates the central concerns of the Commerce Clause, viz., the promotion
of a national economy and free trade among the states.""' The Court, again, had a
sense that Congress' regulation was consistent with the purpose for which the
Commerce Clause had been adopted.
C. Lopez
The most recent Commerce Clause case, Lopez, confirms the interplay between
the four-prong test and the rules the Court has espoused. In Lopez, there is another
unprecedented permutation of doctrine--the origination of a commercial/non-
commercial distinction. However, the connection to commerce does not seem to be
so weak as to make the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 19906' unjustifiable under
previous case law. Justice Breyer is correct when he says that application of the
Gun-Free School Zones Act to Lopez could be justified under the substantial effects
test.
What then is the difference between Lopez and the cases that came before? First,
the seriousness of the national problem to be addressed was not clear to the Court.
The Court made no statements indicating that guns-in-school-zones was a serious
problem. Further, the Act lacked any findings to the effect that guns in school zones
even affected commerce. Although the government argued that the presence of guns
in schools undermines the learning environment, which in turn creates a less-
educated, less productive citizenry,' the Court concluded that such an argument
would require it to "pile inference on inference" in a manner it was unwilling to
do.167
Second, the guns-in-schools problem did not need to be addressed by a national
government. There was no indication that problems of competition prevented states
from enacting beneficial legislation, as in Darby, Jones & Laughlin Steel, and
Hodel. Nor was there an indication that states were unwilling to enact such
legislation, as in McClung and Heart of Atlanta Motel. Finally, there was no sign
that states could not deal with this problem on their own, as there was in Perez and
Hodel. To the contrary, the majority opinion, endorsing consideration of the
necessity of federal action, quotes a criticism of the Act by then President Bush,
who said, "Most egregiously, [the Act] inappropriately overrides legitimate state
firearms laws with a new and unnecessary Federal law. The policies reflected in
these provisions could legitimately be adopted by the States, but they should not be
imposed upon the States by Congress."'"
164. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 563 n.5 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting. joined
by Rehnquist, J., and O'Connor, J.). Although National League of Cities was overruled in Garcia, the dissenting
opinion claims that the Garcia majority fundamentally misunderstood the nature of the National League of Cities
test. That test was one of balancing rather than one that looked to traditional areas of state control. See id. at 561-
62.
165. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(l)(A) (1988 ed. & Supp. V.).
166. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
167. See id. at 567.
168. Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Federal Power and Federalism, A Theory of Commerce Clause
Based Regulation of Traditionally State Crimes, 47 CASE W. RES. L REV. 921,936 & n.39 (1997) (citing Lopez,
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Third, the regulation in question implicated the federal/state balance. It was
evident that the Justices were concerned about the expansion of the commerce
power and the effect it would have on this system of federalism. This had not been
so in earlier modem cases. However, in Lopez it seemed to animate the Court's
opinion."6 "When Congress criminalizes conduct already denounced as criminal by
the States," notes the Court, "it effects a 'change in the sensitive relation between
federal and state criminal jurisdiction."' ' 170 Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion states, "Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches
of the Federal Government serves to prevent the accumulation of excessive power
in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front."171
Moreover, the Court was careful not to approve a law which would leave the
door open to "convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a
general police power of the sort retained by the States."'" The majority finished its
opinion stating that it was "unwilling" to obliterate the distinction between what is
"truly national and what is truly local.' ' 73 Even the dissenting Justices were careful
to reserve some sphere of state control, although they were unable to say how their
test might protect it.1
74
Hence, Lopez is best distinguished from other modem commerce power cases on
the basis of the four-prong test. The Court's formal doctrine provides no real
distinction. Rather, the difference lies in the absence of a serious and demonstrated
problem which demanded a national solution, and in the presence of a concern for
the federal/state balance.
III. FORMULATION OF A NEW TEST
The remainder of this article proposes that the four-prong test identified above
be formally adopted. The point of this section is to explain the exact form this test
might take and to defend it against certain objections. This article offers the four-
prong test as a replacement to the current commerce clause rules.
A. Nexus to Commerce Power
The first prong of the four-prong test would incorporate the Court's current
jurisprudence; if there is not a sufficient nexus to the interstate commerce power,
then the regulation fails to pass the test and must be struck down. That is, Congress
must regulate a channel or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or the activity
regulated must have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Hence, the mere
presence of a serious exigency requiring a national solution would not justify
514 U.S. at 561 n.3 and its reference to the Statement of President Bush on Signing the Crime Control Act of 1990,
26 WEEKLY Comp. PREs. Doc. 1944, 1945 (Nov. 29, 1990)).
169. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-68.
170. Id. at 561 n.3 (quoting United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1973) (quoting United States
v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971))).
171. Id. at 552 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,458 (1991)).
172. Id. at 567.
173. Id. at 567-68.
174. See id. at 622-25 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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federal intervention unless there is also some connection to interstate commerce. Of
course, where Congress is regulating interstate commerce itself then no question is
raised and the nexus test does not arise.
The Court's decision under this prong would not be dispositive and therefore it
would not be tempted to expand doctrine in ways that may lead to seemingly
limitless government power. Nor would it be tempted to contract doctrine in ways
that seem arbitrary. Instead, the connection to commerce would be recognized as a
matter of degree and strict categorizations would be unnecessary. Therefore, the
first prong of the four-prong test could incorporate the Court's distinction between
regulation of commercial and non-commercial activity."" However, it would
evaluate the degree to which an activity is commercial, and not make absolute
determinations about the matter.
In addition, the Court should also consider whether the Congressional enactment
in question comports with the purpose behind granting the commerce power in the
first place. If the purpose of the Commerce Clause is served by the regulation, then
a stronger nexus exists. If not, the nexus is weaker. Hence, in cases in which the
commerce power is being used to effect some other purpose than the regulation of
commerce, such as a police power purpose found in Champion and McClung, the
Court would be free to acknowledge that such regulations are at the outer edges of
the commerce power. Similarly, the Court could recognize that the prohibition of
lottery tickets, for instance, has a weaker nexus to the commerce power than, say,
regulation of differential railroad rates, which preserves the movement of goods
across state lines.
This helps provide a check on the "substantial effects" test. The effect of an
activity on commerce would carry more weight when the regulation was enacted to
make interstate commerce flow more smoothly, as in Shreveport Rate Cases.
However, the effect of an activity would carry less weight when Congress was
attempting to use its commerce power for purposes unrelated or only thinly related
to interstate commerce, as in Champion or McClung.
B. Seriousness of the Exigency with which Congress is Faced
A serious exigency has been present in all the cases affirming federal power, and
has been absent (at least as to findings) in the one modern case denying federal
power. This factor would also be fairly deferential and its intent would be to make
sure that Congressional action is really necessary. Failure to pass this prong
probably would not result in many invalidations because politicians generally only
pass laws in response to relatively serious problems. However, this factor would
prevent Congressional grandstanding by giving the Court a means by which to
invalidate laws that were passed for primarily political reasons. 76
Hence, the absence of a serious problem should be cause to invalidate a federal
law enacted under the Commerce Clause. Of course, the seriousness of the exigency
175. See Lopez. 514 U.S. at 551.
176. The Gun-Fee School Zones Act may be characterized as one such law. Justices Kennedy and O'Connor
seem to imply this in their Lopez concunence when they state that "momentary political convenience" often tempts
legislators not to consider their role in the federal/state balance. See id at 577.
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should not alone be enough to expand federal power-in some cases, such as
Schechter and Hammer, federal power was denied despite the presence of a national
"crisis." Further, the mere claim of an emergency by the national government
should not be enough to confer commerce power; any findings would have to be
subject to independent judicial inquiry and scrutiny under Lopez.
C. Necessity that Solution be National
1. Form the Prong Would Take
The third prong of the test is the part most likely to provide a check on federal
power under the Commerce Clause. Under this prong, the Court would ask whether
a national solution, as opposed to a state or local solution, is necessary to address
the problem at hand. In addition, per Lopez, the Court would ask whether the
exercise of this power was "an appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate
end." 1
77
For reasons stated below, this factor would be fairly deferential to Congress,
invalidating Congressional acts only when the justification offered is "egregiously
mistaken." The level of scrutiny should be that employed in Lopez. The Court
should conduct an independent analysis and engage in a harsher probing than the
"rational basis" test might allow. Hence, Congressional findings would not be
dispositive. Conversely, the absence of findings would not necessarily condemn a
regulation, although it would place the regulation in a more precarious spot. The
end result would be that where there is a questionable regulation, Congress would
have an incentive to make a study determining the need for federal intervention.
2. Objection as to the Competence of the Court
A valid objection to the four-prong test is that in evaluating the necessity of
federal action, the Court would be doing something it is fundamentally ill-equipped
to do: make policy decisions. This same objection was addressed by George A.
Bermann in connection with the issue of subsidiarity in the European Union. The
Maastricht Treaty on European Union requires that institutions of the Community
act in areas of concurrent competence "only if and insofar as the objectives of the
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States."'78 This test
bears close resemblance to the "necessity of national action" standard (the third
prong) of the four-prong test.
Bermann contends that courts are not "especially well-equipped to make the
substantive judgment" whether national action is or is not necessary. 79 Judicial
scrutiny of this type of decision can be problematic and Bermann suggests that
Courts make the subsidiarity requirement one primarily of procedure rather than
substance. 8° Hence, the Court would require that
177. Id. at 555.
178. George A. Benman, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Union and the United
States, 94 COLUM. L REV. 331,334 (1994) (citing Treaty on European Union, Article G(5)).
179. Id. at 336.
180. See id.
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before adopting a measure... institutions inquire meaningfully into the capacity
of the Member States to attain the objectives that the measure is intended to
achieve and explain why they conclude that action at the Community level is
necessary. In ensuring that the institutions ask and answer the right questions
before acting, the Court in effect enforces a procedural mandate, something it
is well-equipped to do.''
The "necessity of federal action" prong should reflect Bermann's idea. It is
indeed the case that courts do not have the same capacity, compared to legislatures,
to make substantive choices about the necessity of federal action. At most, courts
can determine whether a legislative finding as to the necessity of government action
is "egregiously mistaken."' Hence, the Court's requirement under this factor
should be primarily procedural and fairly deferential. However, per Lopez, the
Court need not accept the findings without scrutiny.
Such a test would not be too weak to have any meaningful effect. As Bermann
points out, one of the most important functions of asking whether Community (or
federal) action is necessary is that it forces legislative institutions to take the idea
of subsidiarity seriously.' The same is true for federalism in the United States. The
mere willingness of courts to consider the necessity of a national response may
check unnecessary expansions of federal power.1
As a final note, despite the questionable competency of courts to determine the
necessity of federal action, I have made clear that the Supreme Court already seems
to be doing so. Hence, objecting to the four-prong test on those grounds is
somewhat inapt. The real issue is whether this consideration should be formalized.
As I have pointed out, making this issue formal would force Congress to take the
necessity of its action seriously. It would also bring the current decisionmaking
process into the light, where it belongs.
3. Authority for Employing this Prong
In a symposium on Lopez,"5 Donald H. Regan also suggested that the necessity
of federal action be factored into the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 86
Regan points out that this idea was embodied in the sixth Virginia Resolution,
which was approved by the Constitutional Convention in July 1787.287 The language
is as follows:
That the National Legislature ought to possess the Legislative Rights vested in
Congress by the Confederation; and moreover, to legislate in all cases for the
general interests of the union, and also in those to which the States are
separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be
interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation."8
181. Id.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See Regan, supra note 39.
186. See id. at 555.
187. See id.
188. Id (citing NOiS OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON
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Unfortunately, Regan provides little authority for employing this test. He is
careful to note that this language is not found in the Constitution and instead relies
on the structure of the Constitution itself to provide its authority.'89 In enumerating
powers, notes Regan, the Framers were capturing the spirit of the Virginia
Resolutions if not the actual words.' 90 However, as Regan himself makes evident,
reliance on the structure of the Constitution to provide authority for employing this
test has limited currency. Although the principle underlying the enumeration of
powers found in the Constitution seems to imply some presumption against use of
federal power-a presumption that, if put into words, would look similar to the
sixth Virginia Resolution 1--this alone is not enough support for changing
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Regan seems to believe that the best support for employing his test is that it puts
the Commerce Clause jurisprudence "on a reasonable footing."" In illustrating his
test, Regan applies it to nearly all of the important Commerce Clause decisions and
shows how the result can be arrived at through his more reasonable test rather than
through the sometimes "transparently inadequate" justifications offered by the
Court.' 93 His analyses are convincing.
What is still missing from Regan's approach is adequate support in case law for
employing a test that asks whether a national solution is required for a particular
problem. However, as I have shown, Commerce Clause cases have employed a test
similar to Regan's approach from the start. Regan emphasizes "how different [his]
approach is... from the currently established mode of arguing for the existence of
federal power.'" But while his approach is very different from modes of arguing
the extent of federal power, it is not so different from modes of deciding the extent
of federal power. Regan's formulations are best offered not merely as wishful
thinking, but as an empirical explanation of what the Court has in fact been doing
with Commerce Clause doctrine. In this sense, Regan's proposals are based not only
a reading of the structure of the Constitution, but in the jurisprudence as it already
stands.
D. Concern for "Federal/State Balance"
1. Form this Prong Would Take
The "federal/state balance" factor would overlap with the "necessity of federal
action" requirement, which provides some protection in itself for maintenance of
the system of federalism. However, the "federal/state balance" factor would provide
this protection explicitly. For reasons stated below, this prong would only come to
work when Congress has "tipped the scales too far." 9 1
380 (W.W. Norton & Co. ed., 1966)).
189. See id. at 556.
190. See i&. at 555.
191. See Id. at 555-56.
192. l at 556.
193. See id. at 557.
194. Id. at 609.
195. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995); see also infra notes 209 and 213.
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The Court might consider whether the federal action would impinge on areas of
traditional state concern, such as criminal law, family law, or private activities. This
was the case in Lopez. The Court might also consider whether the action would
create governance more distant from the "people" than state government, which was
also a concern in Lopez. Another consideration would be whether the enactment in
question is best characterized as a police power regulation or as protection of
interstate commerce. If the latter, the case for maintaining state sovereignty over the
issue is less forceful since states relinquished power to the federal government when
they granted the federal government enumerated powers. Yet another consideration
might be whether the enactment in question was meant to coordinate state policies,
giving effect to already existing laws, or whether it was meant to override state
laws. 1 If the act is meant to coordinate state policies, and if by non-redundancy it
passed the "necessity of national action" prong, then the federal/state balance would
be of less concern because the federal law would merely empower laws originated
at the state level. This was the case in Champion. However, if the federal law
contradicted many states' laws the enactment should be more suspect.
2. Objection as to the Competence of the Courts
As with the "necessity of federal action" prong, there is a valid objection as to
the courts' competence to consider the overall balance of federal and state power.
A further objection is that judicial concern over the federal/state balance is
especially indeterminate, can change with the times, and is likely to change even
with the personalities of the Justices. These objections, however, are subject to the
counterargument raised above-that the Court is already considering this factor, and
that formalizing it would force Congress to take federalism seriously. Further,
limiting the application of this prong to extreme cases would help diminish the
uncertainty that may result from use of this prong.
There are other aspects to the problem that must be addressed. While the
federal/state balance prong of the test invites judges to exercise sometimes
indeterminate and discretionary political judgments, it is a necessary component of
any test that is meant to serve as a structural safeguard to the governmental system.
This balance is a source of continuing scholarly debate.
Herbert Wechsler has argued that ensuring the proper balance between federal
and state government should be left to the political process without the intervention
of the courts. As Bermann notes, Wechsler "claims that restraints on intervention
by the federal government flow chiefly from 'the sheer existence of the states and
[from] their political power to influence the action of the national authority."'197
Indeed, the Supreme Court supported this position in Garcia.198 Bermann points out,
however, that confidence in the adequacy of such political safeguards has waned in
the United States.'" "Recent years... have witnessed growing concern over the
196. See Regan, supra note 39, at 575-578.
197. Berrnann, supra note 178, at 404 (quoting Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:
the Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLuM. L REv. 543, 544
(1954)).
198. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 (1985).
199. See Bermann, supra note 178, at 395.
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impact of federal legislation and regulation on the fabric of United States federal-ism.,,200
The reason is that Wechsler is incorrect. "Implicit in [Wechsler's] analysis is the
assumption that Congress actually determines, during the process of deliberating
over proposed legislation, whether federal action is in fact needed for achieving its
purposes," writes Bermann.2 ' However:
The truth of this proposition has never... been demonstrated. Congress' criteria
for assessing the necessity for federal intervention do not in fact seem to be
especially well-defined, and it is certainly far from clear that these criteria entail
a prior assessment of the state's own ability, acting alone or in concert, to
achieve the objectives that Congress has.'
In fact, members of Congress have political incentives to disregard the balance
between federal and state government. The first incentive is obvious: legislators
want credit for having solved problems.2 3 Hence, members of Congress "may
vigorously sponsor initiatives... that could just as easily be undertaken at the state
level .. . ."' This may explain why the Gun-Free School Zones Act passed without
an evaluation of state competence to meet this problem. Further, the groups to
which Congress members are most responsive-interest groups and constitu-
ents-are not concerned with preserving federalism, but with getting their problems
solved. 5 There is no institutional mechanism forcing Congress to deal with issues
of federalism.
Perhaps in recognition of this problem, the Supreme Court in recent years has
concluded that it must play some role in maintaining the federal/state balance. Chief
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Lopez focuses on this issue. Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor write even more forcefully in their concurrence to
Rehnquist's opinion. They state that although the
powers conferred upon the Federal Government by the Constitution were
phrased in language broad enough to allow for the expansion of the Federal
Government's role"... It does not follow.., that in every instance the Court
lacks the authority and responsibility to review congressional attempts to alter
the federal balance. This case requires us to consider our place in the design of
the Government and to appreciate the significance of federalism in the whole
structure of the Constitution.'
Kennedy and O'Connor specifically renounce Wechslerian trust in the political
process to preserve the values of federalism. Although they concede that Congress
200. Id. at 405.
201. Id. at 408.
202. Il at 409 (citing Congress' discussion over the Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act of 1977,
30 U.S.C. § 1201 (1988) and the Public Utility Regulatory Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (1988)).
203. See id.
204. Id.
205. See id. (citing Zoe Baird, State Empowerment After Garcia, 18 UR. LAW. 491,505-06 (1986); Carol
F. Lee, The Political Safeguards of Federalism? Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Decisions on State
and Local Liability, 20 URn. LAw 301,338-39 (1988)).
206. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575 (1995) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
157 (1992)).
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has "substantial discretion and control over the federal balance,"2'7 Kennedy and
O'Connor state that "the absence of structural mechanisms to require those officials
to undertake this principle task [of considering the federal/state balance in
decisionmaking], and the momentary political convenience often attendant upon
their failure to do so, argue against a complete renunciation of the judicial role."2 8
They conclude that "the federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional
structure and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to
intervene when one or the other level of Government has tipped the scales too
far.
209
Although courts may have a duty to preserve the balance of federalism, their
competence to do so is another issue. Kennedy and O'Connor, however, note that
in other areas of jurisprudence involving structural elements of the Constitution,
such as separation of powers and checks and balances, the Court has "derived from
the Constitution workable standards to assist in preserving"210 the Constitutional
structure. In these other areas the "Court has participated in maintaining the federal
balance through judicial exposition of doctrines .. ..,211 Indeed, Kennedy and
O'Connor point out that of the various structural elements in the Constitution-
checks and balances, federalism, judicial review and separation of powers-only
with regard to federalism has the judiciary's role in maintaining the design of the
Framers been in question.212
Nevertheless, requiring courts to consider the federal/state balance may challenge
the courts' competence too much unless that consideration were fairly deferential.
Hence, such a factor should only identify extreme cases in which the expansion of
federal power may "tip the scales too far."2 3 But as is the case with the "necessity
of federal action" factor, the mere willingness of the courts to entertain the issue of
federalism helps make the test efficacious. In that way, courts may force Congress
to take federalism seriously. Thus, despite the fact that "resolution of specific cases
[involving Constitutional structure] has proved difficult"2"4 the Court should
nevertheless endeavor to decide them.
IV. REASONS TO ADOPT THE FOUR-PRONG TEST
A. Rules vs. Standards
As a first issue in evaluating whether to adopt this four-prong test as the standard
for Commerce Clause cases, it is imperative to consider generally the relative merits
of rules and standards as methods of adjudication. The current doctrine can be
termed a "rule" because it seeks to categorize activities, defining bright-line
207. Id. at 577.
208. Id. at 578.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 575 (string cite omitted).
211. Id. at 578.
212. See id. at 575.
213. Id. at 578.
214. Id. at 575.
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boundaries and classifying fact situations as falling on one side or the other.215
Kathleen M. Sullivan defines rules as follows: "A legal directive is "rule"-like when
it binds a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of
delimited triggering facts. Rules aim to confine the decisionmaker to facts, leaving
irreducible arbitrary and subjective value choices to be worked out elsewhere. 216
On the other hand, the four-prong test has more the character of a "standard," in
Sullivan's language,27 because it explicitly considers all relevant factors with an
eye to the underlying purposes or background principles or policies at stake.218 A
standard "tends to collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the
background principle or policy to a fact situation. Standards allow for the decrease
of errors of under- and over-inclusiveness by giving the decision-maker more
discretion than do rules. 21 9 Moreover, they "allow the decisionmaker to take into
account all relevant factors or the totality of the circumstances. '2 °
1. Reasons Rules are Thought Superior to Standards, and Why Such
Reasons Do Not Hold When It Comes to Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
According to Sullivan, the first argument favoring application of rules is that they
provide more fairness than standards because they force decisionmakers to act
consistently, treating like cases alike.' Hence, well-formulated rules are supposed
to reduce the danger of official arbitrariness or bias. This argument does not hold
water when applied to Commerce Clause cases because Commerce Clause
jurisprudence is driven not by adherence to the particular rule of the Commerce
Clause, but by imperatives that do not find their way into doctrine. Indeed, the rules
governing the commerce power actually change according to these unarticulated
imperatives. Thus, although a rule is supposed to "capture the background principle
or policy in a form that from then on operates independently,"' it is clear that in
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the rule has never acted independently of the
background policy. Such malleable rules do not force decisionmakers to act
consistently; hence, the danger of official arbitrariness is not diminished.
'Further, a rule "necessarily captures the background principle or policy
incompletely and so produces errors of over- or under-inclusiveness." 3 This
problem is especially evident with regard to Commerce Clause cases. As has been
shown, the failure of the substantial effects test is that it is too inclusive and would
permit regulation of just about anything. On the other hand, tests like those
formulated in Lopez and Carter are too under-inclusive, not permitting the national
government to address important commerce-related problems it is uniquely able to
address. Hence, the rules of Commerce Clause doctrine do not treat "like cases
215. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Forward: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L REV. 22,60 (1992).
216. Id. at 58.
217. Of course, the "distinctions between rules and standards ... mark a continuum, not a divide." Id. at 61.
218. See id, at60.
219. Id. at 58-59.
220. Id. at 59.
221. See id. at 62.
222. Id. at 58.
223. Id. at 60.
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alike" because they fail to incorporate important factors of the policy underlying the
rule. The result is inconsistency rather than consistency.
A third argument favoring rules is that they produce greater certainty and
predictability than standards.' 4 However, the amount of certainty the rules of
Commerce Clause cases provide is questionable. The New Deal era cases are a good
example of a situation in which the Commerce Clause rule failed to provide
certainty to those who may have relied on it. That rule fluctuated in those years
largely because it was the principle and not the rule that was important to the
Court's decisions. Lopez also shows how the Commerce Clause rules provide little
certainty. That case came as a great surprise to most people and was taken as a
signal that Court would invalidate federal legislation in the future. Since the rule by
which the Court decided the case provides little substantive limitation on the federal
government's power, Lopez leaves us with a vague feeling that there are limits on
the commerce power, yet gives us no guidance as to where those limits lie.
A fourth argument favoring rules is that they are essential to liberty225 because
standards invite official arbitrariness if not totalitarianism.2 6 It seems to me the
counterarguments to this argument are embodied above, in the observation that
evolutions in current doctrine seem arbitrary unless one grounds them in the four-
prong test. I would only add that the federalism interest explicitly protected by the
four-prong test is also considered protective of individual liberty.2 7
Finally, rules are thought to encourage judicial restraint.2' As the Lopez decision
shows, and as the above arguments illustrate, the current doctrine provides little
restraint on the judiciary because the rule is so responsive to the principles
underlying it. Judges have not had to fully account for some of the most important
factors in their decisions because the Commerce Clause cases are based on
principles that are not formally acknowledged.
2. Reasons Standards are Thought Superior to Rules, And Why Such Reasons
Hold When it Comes to Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
Sullivan also illustrates the arguments favoring application of standards. First
among these are that standards are also thought to produce fairness. "Rule-based
decisionmaking suppresses relevant similarities and differences; standards allow
decisionmakers to treat like cases that are substantively alike."229 The suppression
of relevant differences that results from poorly formulated rules can be seen in
connection with Lopez, in which there was an absence of a crisis needing national
attention, and the presence of federalism concerns. None of these differences made
their way into the formal doctrine, yet they were important factors distinguishing
Lopez from previous case law. The four-prong test would acknowledge these
factors, allowing judges to take into consideration relevant similarities and
differences among cases.
224. See id. at 62.
225. See id. at 63.
226. See id. at 64.
227. See. e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
228. See Sullivan, supra note 215, at 65.
229. Id. at 66.
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There is also a utility argument favoring standards. Rules "tend toward
obsolescence" whereas standards are "flexible and allow decisionmakers to adapt
them to changing circumstances over time."23 Clearly, the four-prong test has this
advantage since Commerce Clause jurisprudence is a graveyard of obsolete rules.
In the context of the ever-dynamic circumstances surrounding exercises of the
commerce power, an adaptable test is preferable to a rigid one that may become
outmoded.
Of course, it could be argued that current commerce power doctrine has allowed
the Court to be adaptable as well; indeed it has. The modem doctrine, for the most
part, has permitted adaptability in only one direction-that of expanding federal
power to meet various exigencies. Once the circumstances called for a retraction or
a denial of federal power, as in Lopez, the Court seems to have found itself
hampered by the Commerce Clause rule and its subsequent adaptation has been
tortured. Further, this flexibility of modem doctrine has come at the cost of
providing an insufficient check on federal power. A new test would permit the
Court this flexibility while maintaining a plausible and principled leash on the
commerce power.
A third relevant advantage of standards is that of deliberation: "Rules favor
judicial abdication of responsibility, while standards make the judges face up to
their choices ... Open balancing compels a judge to take full responsibility for his
decisions, and promises a particularized, rational account of how he arrives at
them."23' As long as there are considerations in Commerce Clause doctrine that
remain formally unincorporated, the Court is unaccountable for its decisions. As the
mechanics behind the Court's decisionmaking process remain obscured from the
legal community, politicians, and the public, the Court's reasoning is not fully
subjected to proper scrutiny because the rules of decision do not require judges to
fully account for every relevant consideration.
This not only results in unaccountability, but must result in poorly thought-out
decisions. Since judges do not fully consider the factors important to their
decisions, their deliberation is incomplete and necessarily of inferior quality. The
four-prong test, on the other hand, would force the Court to tackle relevant issues
head-on. It would also subject the courts to scrutiny not only among themselves, but
by the legal community. This would increase the quality of decisionmaking.
B. General Reasons Why the Four-Prong Test is Appropriate for Commerce
Clause Jurisprudence
1. The Four-Prong Test Would Place a Substantive Limit on Federal Power
Perhaps the best reason to adopt the four-prong test is that it would provide a true
check on the commerce power by having an explicit requirement that national
action be necessary to solve the problem at hand and that it not infringe on the
system of federalism. This checking effect would come not only from the Court's
formal test, but from the Court's mere willingness to entertain such issues as the
230. Id.
231. d at 67-68.
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necessity of federal action and the federal/state balance. This would provide a
deterrent to unnecessary expansions of power under the Commerce Clause.232
Hence, by creating a procedural safeguard against expansion of federal power,233 the
four-prong test would provide the "structural mechanism" by which Congress would
have to consider its role in the federal/state system--the mechanism whose absence
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor lament in the concurrence to Lopez.234
2. The Four-Prong Test Would Hold States Accountable for Solving
Important Problems Without Unnecessarily Treading on Sovereign Interests
Another reason to adopt this test is that it enables Congress to put pressure on
states to solve important commerce-related problems without treading too much on
state sovereignty. The inflexibility of current doctrine requires the Court to decide
whether Congress can regulate a particular activity without regard to whether the
states can adequately deal with it. The Court is forced into a difficult choice because
it cannot consider the ability of states to handle a given problem: if it decides that
a problem is within the sphere of state control, it requires that the problem will
persist even if states prove unwilling or unable to deal with it. On the other hand,
if the Court decides that the problem is within the province of the federal
government to handle, then federal power may expand even though there is no
necessity for it.
A Court considering the VAWA faces the same dilemma. The problem of
violence against women has not been adequately handled by the states; however, it
remains an issue whether states are ultimately incompetent or unwilling to correct
this problem. Given the current doctrine, if the Court strikes down VAWA it will
have declared that area of legislation off-limits to the federal government for good.
This leaves states free to neglect the problem without fear of a federal usurpation
of their powers. On the other hand, if the Court upholds the Act, it will have
expanded federal power in an instance in which necessity was questionable.
Adopting the four-prong test evades this trap. It does not permit federal intrusion
in cases where need has not been demonstrated because it asks whether states are
competent to handle a particular problem. However, a decision to disallow federal
intervention does not necessarily foreclose the possibility that the federal
government may regulate a sphere of activity. This puts pressure on states to react
to the problem of, for instance, violence against women, by threatening to usurp
their role if they fail to respond adequately to the problem. If the states fail, the
federal government may intervene to solve the problem because the necessity of
intervention will have been made clear.
This is not to say that the four-prong test would allow the federal government to
completely usurp the function of the states; the fourth prong of the test would
protect against that. Indeed, certain areas may be permanently off-limits to the
national government. In marginal areas in which jurisdiction is unclear, however,
the four-prong test gives states an incentive to tackle serious problems.
232. See Bennann, supra note 178, at 336-37 (1994).
233. See infra note 286-88; Bermann, supra note 178, at 336.
234. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995).
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One objection to the four-prong test may be that because the test is time-
dependent it allows the Commerce Clause to mean different things at different
times, depending on either the relative balance of the federal and state governments,
or on the particular competencies of the governments. This is true, and may be the
price of flexibility. It seems impossible to define the parameters of the Commerce
Clause once and for all without regard to the social circumstance in which it is
considered.
3. The Four-Prong Test Would put Commerce Clause Jurisprudence on a
Reasonable Footing Without Upsetting the Substantial Reliance Placed
on Decisions to Date
The four-prong test is descriptive of Commerce Clause decisions and thus would
not alter the results of the case law. Instead, it would merely put these cases on a
more reasonable footing, making their outcome clearer and easier to understand.
Hence, adopting the four-prong test would honor the fact that "the Court as an
institution and the legal system as a whole have an immense stake in the stability
of... Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it has evolved to this point."235
Adopting the four-prong test would not upset the reliance on Commerce Clause
jurisprudence so far and therefore the stare decisis reasons for adhering to
precedential rules of decision are substantially lessened.236 The four-prong test
really just reflects factors that have always been important to Commerce Clause
cases and adopting it would honor, more than breach, the stare decisis rule.
In addition, adoption of the four-prong test would not force a reversion to "an
understanding of commerce that would serve only an 18th-century economy."237 if
anything, the test would bring Commerce Clause jurisprudence into the modem era
once and for all. It would help the Court abandon the formalistic definitions of the
extent of commerce power by whole-heartedly embracing the practical conception
of Commerce Clause thinking that the Court has endorsed since Jones & Laughlin
Steel.2
38
V. APPLYING THE FOUR-PRONG TEST TO THE VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN ACT
VAWA was part of a comprehensive crime package239 passed in 1994. It was
written as a response to evidence that "violence motivated by gender" was on the
rise despite states' efforts to address the issue.24 Among other provisions, VAWA
235. Id. at 574 (Kennedy. J., and O'Connor, J., concurring).
236. Stare decisis exists as a "policy, grounded on the theory that security and certainty require that accepted
and established legal principle... be recognized and followed ... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed.
1990).
237. Lopez. 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J., and O'Connor, J., concurring).
238. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J., and O'Connor, J., concurring).
239. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796
(codified in various sections of 16 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
240. VAWA 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
241. See Isa A. Carroll, Women's Powerless Tool: How Congress Overreached the Constitution with the
Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, 30 J. MARSHAlL L REv. 803 (1997) (citing S. REP. No.
101-545, at 38 (1990)).
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creates a civil rights cause of action against anyone who "commits a crime of
violence motivated by gender." 22
In Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,u3 the Fourth
Circuit invalidated VAWA's civil rights provision largely on the grounds that Lopez
does not permit the exercise of the commerce power to regulate non-commercial
acts." However, in reading the opinion, it becomes immediately apparent that
concerns of federalism (the fourth prong) are what primarily animated the Fourth
Circuit in striking down VAWA. Hence, the Fourth Circuit's opinion is consistent
with other Commerce Clause cases which purport to rely on untenable rules but
actually decide the case according to the four-prong test.
The object of this section is to analyze VAWA under the proposed test to show
that the test is not only workable, but is better than the current doctrine at
addressing the concerns underlying Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
A. Nexus to Commerce Power
In determining the strength of VAWA's nexus to the commerce power, the Court
should apply not only the formal test that has been formulated thus far in Commerce
Clause decisions, but it should also ask how closely Congress' law comports with
the purpose underlying the original grant of the commerce power. The civil rights
remedy of VAWA has no jurisdictional tie-in to the channels or instrumentalities
of interstate commerce, nor does it apply only to persons or things in interstate
commerce.2 45 VAWA requires no proof of interstate activity because "Congress
intended VAWA to sweep much more broadly."' Hence, if there is a nexus to
interstate commerce it must come through the "substantial effects" test.24 7
In terms of the first prong of the test, the Court should find that Congress had ajustifiable basis for finding that violence against women exerts a substantial effect
on interstate commerce. Unlike in Lopez, Congress made findings before passing
VAWA, and the government did not rely on post-hoc findings of effects on
commerce to justify the enactment in question.4 However, the activity regulated
can fairly be characterized as non-commercial, even non-economic, in nature, so
under Lopez the connection to interstate commerce is significantly weakened.
242. VAWA § 13891(c).
243. 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cit. 1999), cert. granted sub nom. U.S. v. Morrison __ S. Ct. __ No. 99-5, 1999
WL459152 (Sept. 1999).
244. See id. at 830-36.
245. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University, 935 F. Supp. 772, 776 (W.D. Va. 1996);
rev'd by 132 F.3d 949 (4th Ci. 1997), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated (1998).
246. Carroll, supra note 241, at 805 (citing Domestic Violence, Not Just a Family Matter: Hearing Before
the House Judiciary Comm. on Crime and Criminal Justice, 103d Congress 1 (1994) (statement of Charles
Schumer, Representative. 10th Cong. Dist., N.Y., declaring that the purpose of the hearing was to help all of the
four million women each year who are victimized by domestic violence), available in 1994 WL 313572 [F.D.C.H.].
247. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,559 (1995).
248. It is indicative of current Commerce Clause jurisprudence that the Fourth Circuit awkwardly
characterizes the issue of findings not a "mere factual or empirical inquiry" but as a "legal test," and the phrase
"substantially affects interstate commerce" as one of'legal art." See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 831. By creating an
opening in which to explicitly incorporate federalism concerns into the formal rules by which commerce power
cases are decided, this unprecedented statement may represent an effort to establish something resembling the four-
prong test, which incorporates principles that underlie those formal rules.
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The second part of this prong includes an evaluation of whether VAWA's civil
rights remedy comports with the purpose behind the original grant of the commerce
power to Congress. Although one reason the commerce power was created was to
ensure the health of interstate commerce-and VAWA does that-it is clear that the
commerce power was not intended to permit Congress to enact police power
regulations.249 Since VAWA has essential characteristics of a police power
regulation, its nexus to the commerce power must be considered weaker than if
Congress had enacted a law whose sole purpose was to protect or facilitate
interstate commerce, as in Shreveport Rate Cases. This would not be fatal to
VAWA, of course, because many other Commerce Clause cases have validated
enactments whose primary purpose or effect can be characterized as police-like.
However, it makes it necessary that the other factors in the four-prong test show
themselves more strongly than otherwise would be the case.
B. Seriousness of the Exigency
All that needs to be shown in this factor is that a serious exigency exists which
Congress plans to meet. The presence of a serious problem alone would not be
enough to justify exercise of the commerce power; however, absence of such a
problem may invalidate such an exercise. Unlike in Lopez, Congress has made
detailed studies, which are discussed below, showing that in fact there is a serious
problem in the administration of justice in sex-based violent crimes. On this score,
the four-prong test should not impede VAWA.
C. Need for a National Solution
Under this factor, the question is whether or not national, as opposed to state or
local, action is necessary in facing the problem with which Congress is attempting
to deal. Additionally, part of this prong includes the question whether the means
Congress has chosen to address the problem are reasonably adapted to the end. As
to this prong of the test, analysis of VAWA is not necessarily demonstrative of how
such an analysis may take place were a four-prong test actually implemented. Since
no such test exists, Congress has not made findings with an eye toward justifying
an exercise of its commerce power. Hence, any evidence found in congressional
records is not as complete as it could be. For this reason, this article will draw from
other available evidence to determine whether VAWA should pass this prong of the
test.
Part of the basis for Congress' passage of VAWA was the failure of the states to
adequately address the problem of sex-based crimes. House hearings show that
police often fail to thoroughly investigate domestic violence and fail to collect
corroborating evidence.2" Another House report documented a bias among
Maryland prosecutors by which they often refuse to prosecute domestic violence
249. But see Crosskey, supra note 62 and accompanying text.
250. See Violence Against Women: Hearings Before the Subcomm on Crime and Criminal Justice of the
House Comm on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 75 (1992), not available in WL.
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cases.25" ' Further, a California study found that "victims of domestic violence are
often denied access to the protection of the justice system." '252
Kerrie E. Maloney has demonstrated the inadequacy of many state legal systems
regarding violence against women. State laws themselves often form the most
formidable barrier to women seeking redress for violence committed against them
since most domestic violence incidents are classified only as misdemeanors253 and
rape of a spouse is not a crime in some jurisdictions.M
Female victims of violent crime are also subject to under-enforcement of laws.
Even when domestic violence cases are reported, police do not make arrests in the
majority of cases.255 And even when arrests are made, prosecution of domestic
violence incidents is inadequate because the cases are often viewed as "one-on-one"
cases for which there is no corroborating evidence. 6 Also, "some jurisdictions
place procedural barriers in the victim's path, such as waiting periods before a
domestic violence complaint may be filed."' 7 Charges that are filed are sometimes
dropped when, in another context, they would not be dropped.25" Finally, very few
battering cases result in jail sentences. 9
Enforcement is also a problem when rape is the crime. The victim may be made
to feel she is "on trial" by common defense practices such as exposing her prior
sexual history or her reputation for unchasteness.2 ° Sometimes prosecutors try to
convince rape victims to drop charges because they find it difficult to convict.26'
Further, "stereotypical attitudes about women and violent crime often cause juries
and judges to disbelieve victims and acquit defendants. 262 Judges and juries can
trivialize domestic violence and put the blame for rape on the victim.263
Although these problems show that the administration of justice in sex-based
violence cases is woefully inadequate, they do not demonstrate that a civil rights
remedy to sex-based violence cases will improve matters. Nor do they show that
states are unwilling or unable to handle the problem; in fact, VAWA places great
reliance on the states to do just that. Further, there has been no showing of special
competence of the federal government to handle the problem, even if states are
unable. In short, these observations do not show the necessity for national action
under the four-prong test.
251. See H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 27 (1993).
252. REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENDER BIAs IN THE COURTS OF
CALIFORNIA 2 (1991).
253. See Kerrie E. Maloney, Gender-Motivated Violence and the Commerce Clause: The Civil Rights
Provision of the Violence Against Women Act After Lopez, 96 COLUM. L REV. 1876 (1996) (citing EVE S.
BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTIcE RESPONSE 24, 82-83 (1990)).
254. See id at 1887 (citing WIJAM M GREEN. RAPE: THE EVIDENTIAL EXAMINATION AND MANAGEMENT
OF THE ADULT FEMALE VICTIM 24 (1988)).
255. See iL at 1889 n.50.
256. See id. at 1890 n.54.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1890 n.56; Carroll, supra note 241, at 803 n.74.
259. See Maloney, supra note 256, at 1890 n.57; Carroll, supra note 241, at 803 n.75.
260. See Maloney, supra note 256, at 1890 n.61.
261. See id at 1891 n.62.
262. Id. at 1891.
263. See id. at 1891 nn.66-71; Carroll, supra note 241, at 814 nn.82-83.
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Further, it is not clear that justice administered by federal courts would encounter
less difficulty. Judges, prosecutors and juries in federal courts may be just as likely
to have detrimental attitudes as their counterparts in state systems. They would also
likely still rely on evidence and investigations conducted by local police.2"
In only one regard does the need for a national solution seem to have been
addressed by Congress. VAWA "is an important step . . . in the direction of
developing what we need the most-a national consensus that this society will not
tolerate this kind of violence."'s 5 However, a civil rights remedy is not necessary to
establishing this consensus. Indeed, the Act's numerous other provisions,
establishing grants, studies and educational programs,266 will go far in creating this
consensus.
The incompetence of the states to correct this problem is also far from proven.
Every state outlaws domestic violence and rape. Although enforcement of these
laws has been inadequate, the awareness of the severity of these problems is
relatively recent. Examining the various provisions of VAWA shows that the
problem of violence against women has only recently made a showing on the
national radar screen. Section 13961 establishes a research agenda convening a
"panel of nationally recognized experts" to examine issues involved with violence
against women.26" Congress also established a study on campus sexual assault,2" a
report on battered women's syndrome,' a report on confidentiality of addresses for
victims of domestic violence,' 0 and a report on record keeping relating to domestic
violence.27t Finally, the Attorney General must issue an annual report providing
information to Congress on the incidence of stalking and domestic violence, and
evaluating the effectiveness of states at meeting these crimes.
272
Since the abundance of the studies and reports ordered by Congress show that
national awareness of the severity of the problem of violence against women is a
relatively new phenomenon, it can hardly be expected that states would have
reacted to this problem when fairly little is known about it. Indeed, even the federal
government has not been interested in the problem very long. In 1989, it appropri-
ated only $8.5 million to solving this problem whereas under the 1990 version of
VAWA, that amount would have been $125 million.273
Further, states have been willing to address the problem of sex-based crimes.
Forty-six states have followed the federal government in enacting rape shield laws
that restrict admissibility of a victim's past sexual history in sex-related crimes
264. However, the Senate asserted that because federal courts had less prejudice than state courts and were
not shackled by "antiquated" procedural rules, they were a more appropriate forum for remedying sex-based crimes.
See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 48 (1991).
265. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 42 (1993).
266. See infra notes 270-75.
267. VAWA 42 U.S.C. § 13961 (1994). However, the report does not identify which rules it considered
antiquated. See Carroll, supra note 241, at 814 n.87.
268. See VAWA § 14012.
269. See id. § 14013.
270. See id § 14014.
271. See id.§ 14015.
272. See id. § 14039.
273. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 39 (1990).
Spring 1999]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
trials.274 Moreover, Maryland, Georgia, California and Connecticut studied the
problem as early as 19910275 Lastly, Illinois and several other states have passed
revised sex crime statutes that resulted in increased conviction rates for violent
crimes against women. 6
Furthermore, VAWA actually demonstrates a confidence in the states to solve
this problem. Besides its civil rights provision, VAWA directs the Attorney General
to report to the states on how they may "collect centralized databases on the
incidence of sexual and domestic violence offenses within a State."2' The Attorney
General is also directed to provide grants to states, tribes and local governments
establishing projects to "investigate and prosecute incidents of domestic violence
.... ,
27 Further, Congress authorized the award of grants to States "for the purpose
of developing, testing, presenting, and disseminating model programs to be used by
States in training judges and court personnel in the laws of the States ... on rape,
sexual assault, domestic violence, and other crimes of violence motivated by the
victim's gender."'279 Congress also established a grant program for States to
"improve processes for entering data regarding stalking and domestic violence into
local, State and national crime information databases."'  Another training program
was authorized to train state judges issuing orders in stalking and domestic violence
cases.
281
In sum, while it is clear there is a national problem regarding violence against
women, there has been no showing that the national government is more capable
than the states to address this issue. In other words, just because "states have largely
failed to stem the tide of violence" 2 does not mean that the national government
is more competent to do so. Nor is there a showing that the civil rights remedy of
VAWA will address the problems Congress cites in its reports. Moreover, it has not
been shown that the states are separately incompetent or unwilling to take on this
task. Finally, the relative newness of the problem means that states, and the federal
government for that matter, have had little time to react to this problem, about
which relatively little is known. All these factors counsel against permitting an
exercise of the commerce power in this case.
274. See Paul S. Grobman, Note, The Constitutionality of Statutorily Restricting Public Access to Judicial
Proceedings: The Case of the Rape Shield Mandatory Closure Provision, 66 B.U. L REV. 271, 271 (1986).
275. See CONNECTICUr JUDICIAL TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS, GENDER, JUSTICE AND THE COURTS 17
(1991); ADMINISIRATIVE OFFICES OF THE COURTS OF CAItFORNIA, ACIHEVING EQUAL JUsTICE FOR WOMEN & MEN
IN THE COURTS: REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY CoMMrlTEE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS 2
(1991); SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA, GENDER AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS: A REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF GEORGIA BY THE COMMISSION ON GENDER BIAS IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 34 (1991); MARYLAND SPECIAL JOINT
COMMITEE, GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS 18 (1991).
276. See Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearing on S.15 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong. 67 (1991) (testimony of Roland Burris), not available in WL.
277. VAWA § 13962(a).
278. Id. § 13971(a)(1).
279. Id. § 13991.
280. Id. § 14031(a).
281. See id. § 14036.
282. Maloney, supra note 256, at 1894.
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D. Federal/State Balance
VAWA poses serious concerns for the state of federalism. The issue of violent
crime in general has always been one of state concern, 3 and to usurp this role in
this instance could lead to future erosion of states' governance. This would be of
special concern here, where the other justifications for exercising federal control are
weak.
It may be argued that because Section 13891 is a civil rights remedy for
discriminatory violence against women, it actually falls within a sphere traditionally
regulated by the federal government.' VAWA, however, for the first time seeks
to use the commerce power in regulating purely private behavior, a sphere of
regulation that has been left entirely to the states.2 5 To permit the VAWA civil
rights remedy to pass as an exercise of the commerce power may lead to imbalance
of federal and state power since there would seemingly be no stopping point to the
amount of intrusion the federal government could make into spheres of governance
occupied by the states. The lack of a stopping point was a serious concern in
Lopez, s6 and should be here as well. -
This is not to say that the federal government should be forever barred from
regulating in this area. If states prove incompetent or unwilling to correct the
problems VAWA attempts to address, and if the national government shows special
competence in this area, then this exercise of the commerce power may be justified.
In the absence of such a showing, a stopping point for this kind of regulation seems
impossible to find.
E. Conclusion on the Application of the Four-Prong Test to VAWA
All in all, VAWA has a weak nexus to the commerce power and threatens to
introduce federal legislation into an area in which the states have not only
traditionally been responsible, but in which there has been no showing that states
cannot continue these responsibilities efficaciously. While the seriousness of the
problem is clear, the need to mend it through this kind of federal legislation is not.
VAWA should not pass under the four-prong test. However, the four-prong test is
flexible enough to provide an incentive to states to tackle the serious problem at
hand. By not permanently cordoning off the area of violence against women from
the purview of the federal government, the four-prong test would essentially
threaten states with loss of power unless they handle the problem adequately.
CONCLUSION
In over two centuries of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
failed to articulate a consistent set of rules. Rather, Commerce Clause jurisprudence
has evolved haphazardly as the Court has tried to allow Congress the ability to deal
283. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
284. See Maloney, supra note 256, at 1894.
285. This was a dire concern for the Fourth Circuit, which opened its opinion in Brzonkala by stating that
the Constitution envisioned that "our federal government would be one of enumerated powers, and that all power
unenumerated would be reserved to the several states .... See Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 826.
286. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-65.
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with commerce-related exigencies that arise, but has simultaneously tried to draw
a line past which Congress cannot venture. Now, it seems the Court is faced with
another important exigency-the need to coherently articulate the parameters of
federal power. Instead of once again convoluting doctrine in order to meet this
challenge, the Court ought to formally adopt the test it has always employed. This
would put its jurisprudence on a reasonable footing, allow Congress to solve
important commerce-related problems and provide a substantial limitation on the
power of the federal government.
